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Comments on the Proposed Federal Securities
Code: Transformation of the Securities Act of 1933
NICHOLAS WOLFSON*
The proposed Federal Securities Code lacks an empirical
foundation; no effort was made to determine the actual impact
of the many substantive changes proposed by the Code. Professor
Wolfson recommends that before this massive Code becomes law,
Congress should analyze its costs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The monumental Federal Securities Code' was approved on
May 19, 1978 by The American Law Institute. This vast undertak-
ing was brilliantly shepherded from start to completion by its Re-
porter, the dean of securities lawyers, Professor Louis Loss and his
consultants and advisors. The creation of this Code is an impressive
legal accomplishment. Professor Loss' achievements in drafting this
Code, his achievements qua lawyer, are unique. No one except Pro-
fessor Loss, with his vast knowledge, skill and experience in securi-
ties law, could have brought about this brilliant tour de force. Al-
though I will have some critical comments to make, particularly
with reference to the need for empirical and economic research, no
criticisms can in any way detract from the truly remarkable accom-
plishment of Professor Loss in conceiving and drafting this Code.
The Code represents a recodification of the entire corpus of
federal securities legislation.2 It is a recodification, not a restate-
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
1. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Mar. 1978 Tent. Draft), supplemented by ALI FEDERAL
SECURIIES CODE (Supp. July, Sept. 1978) [hereinafter cited as FED. SEC. CODE].
2. Congress passed a securities statute almost every year from 1933 to 1940. See Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act] Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p-78hh
(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act]; Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79
to 79z-6 (1976); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976); Investment
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ment, and, as such, contains a considerable amount of significant
change in extant law. In the words of Professor Loss, the Code "has
three principal aims: (1) simplification of [a] complex body of law
. . .; (2) elimination . . . of duplicate regulation and (3) reexami-
nation of the entire scheme of investor protection with a view to
increasing its efficiency . . . 3
In the opinion of Professor Loss, "perhaps the most dramatic"
changes effected by the Code are in the 1933 Act.4 This article will
analyze those changes, particularly with reference to the new con-
cept of a distribution presented in the Code.'
Fundamentally, this article will analyze the dangerous lack of
connection between the brilliant drafting and the real world result-
ing from the fact that the Code draftsmen conducted no empirical
tests or research into the potential impact of Code changes.'
The new Code, in a sense, illustrates a principle articulated by
a great poet, Auden, who once ordered as follows: "Thou shalt not
answer a questionnaire, nor quizzes upon world affairs, nor with
compliance take any test; thou shalt not sit with statisticians, nor
commit a social science."7 Or, if I can illustrate with another exam-
ple:
A letter that appeared in Science some time ago related that
some commercial egg farmers who were having difficulties raising
their hens' production called in a theoretical physicist after sev-
eral agricultural scientists had no success. After a few months,
this pundit called a meeting and announced that he had solved
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.c. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1976). The Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers
Act were amended in 1970, Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
547, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10(a) to -10(c), 80a-15, 80a-17(f), 80a-19, 80a-
31(a), 80b-3(b), 80b-5, 80a-10(d), 80a-27, 80a-28, 80a-35 (1976)). Amendments to the 1933 and
1934 Acts were effected by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78
Stat. 565 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 78c, 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p, 78t, 78w, 78ff (1976)), and
the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub, L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78k-1, 78o-4, 78q-1, 78kk, 77d, 77x, 77yyy, 78b, 78c, 78d-1, 78f, 78h, 78k, 781, 78m, 78o,
78o-3, 78q, 78s, 78u, 78w, 78x, 78y, 78bb, 78ee, 78ff, 78iii (1976)).
3. FED. SEC. CODE at xv.
4. Id. at xxv.
5. Id. §§ 501-515. See also text accompanying note 21 infra.
6. As this author has noted in the past, a securities rule is often "promulgated, inter-
preted, applied and evaluated without any [empirical] evidence about the effectiveness of
the rule in the market." Wolfson, The Need for Empirical Research in Securities Law, 49 S.
CAL. L, REv. 286, 287 (1976). Thus, "the comparative effectiveness of one particular formula-
tion of a rule over another remains almost pure guess." Id. at 286.
7. See Auden, Under Which Lyre; A Reactionary Tract for the Times, in COLLECTED
SHORTER POEMS 1927-1957, at 221, 225.
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the problem. He went to the blackboard and began to explain.
'Postulate,' he said, a 'spherical chicken.'"
11. INTEGRATION OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
The Code codifies the current de facto partnership between the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It
does this by replacing the concept of securities registration under
section 12(a) or (g) of the 1934 Act' with the concept of company
8. Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken, 41 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 66, 66 (1977).
9. Section 12(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any member, broker, or dealer to effect any transaction
in any security (other than an exempted security) on a national securities ex-
change unless a registration is effective as to such security for such exchange in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter and the rules and regulations
thereunder.
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1976) (emphasis added), Section 12(g) provides in pertinent
part:
(1) Every issuer which is engaged in interstate commerce, or in a business affect-
ing interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce shall-
(A) within one hundred and twenty days after the last day of its first
fiscal year ended after July 1, 1964, on which the issuer has total assets
exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security (other than an
exempted security) held of record by seven hundred and fifty or more
persons; and,
(B) within one hundred and twenty days after the last day of its first
fiscal year ended after two years from July 1, 1964, on which the issuer
has total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security
(other than an exempted security) held of record by five hundred or
more but less than seven hundred and fifty persons,
register such security by filing with the Commission a registration statement (and
such copies thereof as the Commission may require) with respect to such security
containing such information and documents as the Commission may specify com-
parable to that which is required in an application to register a security pursuant
to subsection (b) of this section. Each such registration statement shall become
effective sixty days after filing with the Commission or within such shorter period
as the Commission may direct. Until such registration statement becomes effec-
tive it shall not be deemed filed for the purposes of section 78r of this title. Any
issuer may register any class of equity security not required to be registered by
filing a registration statement pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph. The
Commission is authorized to extend the date upon which any issuer or class of
issuers is required to register a security pursuant to the provisions of this para-
graph.
Id. § 781(g) (emphasis added). Compare the above provisions with those of the proposed Code,
which requires registration of the issuer, not the security: "A person ... shall file a registra-
tion statement within one hundred twenty days after the first fiscal year-end at which it has
at least $1,000,000 of total assets and five hundred holders of its securities .... " FED. SEC.
CODE § 402 (emphasis added). Note that § 402 refers to securities, not equity securities, as
does the 1934 Act.
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registration. Section 402 of the proposed new legislation requires a
corporation to file a registration statement when it has at least one
million dollars of total assets and five hundred holders of its securi-
ties.'0 When a company files a registration statement, it then enters
the world of continuous disclosure provided for in part VI of the
Code. In bottom line effect, the approach is similar to the current
section 12 and section 15(d) concept in the 1934 Act."
The philosophical approach of the Code reflects the current
administrative practice of the SEC. When the 1933 and 1934 Acts
were originally promulgated, the 1933 Act placed great emphasis
upon the one-shot prospectus disclosure process accompanying the
corporate sale of securities to the public to raise business capital.'2
This approach did not sufficiently take into account the need for an
ongoing disclosure system whereby publicly held corporations would
reveal material facts about their business on a timely and continu-
ous basis. Although the 1934 Act provided a framework for ongoing
disclosure by corporations whose stocks were listed on exchanges,
over-the-counter issuers were not regulated in that respect and the
SEC in general did not require adequately continuous disclosure. '1
The new Code requires a registrant to:
(1) file,
(2) send to every record holder of whatever classes of the regis-
trant's securities (other than commercial paper) the Commission pre-
scribes by rule,
(3) keep for whatever periods the Commission prescribes by
rule, and
(4) publish (through press releases or otherwise).
whatever annual reports (with financial statements), quarterly reports, and other
reports the Commission requires by rule to keep reasonably current the informa-
tion and documents contained in the registration statement or to keep reasonably
current the information and documents contained in the registration statement
or to keep investors reasonably informed with respect to the registrant.
FED. SEC. CODE § 602.
10. In addition to the filing required by § 402 of the Code, an issuer must file a registra-
tion statement (if it has not already filed one) whenever it is required to file an "offering
statement." See FED. SEC. CODE § 403. Furthermore, a registration statement must be filed
when a company's stock is listed on a national stock exchange or included in an over-the-
counter electronic interdealer quotations system. See id. § 903(a), (c).
11. The filing of a registration statement which becomes effective under § 5 of the 1933
Act triggers § 15(d) of the 1934 Act. Section 15(d) requires the issuer to file with the Commis-
sion "such supplementary and periodic information, documents, and reports as may be re-
quired pursuant to section 78m of this title in respect of a security registered pursuant to
section 781 of this title." 1934 Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970).
12. See note 15 infra.
13. See Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Comm., H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), summarized in [1963-1972 Special
Studies Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 74,001 (1963). See also Knauss, A
Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 620-31 (1964).
1498 [Vol. 33:1495
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After many years of benign neglect, the 1964 amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act introduced the concept of a continuous
disclosure system for the over-the-counter corporations as well as
exchange listed issuers.'4 As a result of this legislative impetus and
criticism from the corporate bar,'5 the SEC began to integrate the
disclosure provisions of the 1933 and the 1934 Acts through a profu-
sion of administrative practices and rules." At this particular junc-
ture, then, the proposed Code does no more than reflect present
administrative, practice.
III. PRIMARY DISTRIBUTIONS
Two key provisions in the Code are sections 502 and 504 which
correspond to sections 5(c) and 5(a) of the 1933 Act.'" Section 502(a)
14. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 78c, 781 - 78o-3, 78p, 78t, 78w, 78ff (1976)). Exceptions are set forth in
section 12(g)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2) (1976).
15. In his seminal article on this subject, Milton H. Cohen, former Director of Special
Study of Securities Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission, articulated the need for
coordination of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited,
79 HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966).
16. See generally Heller, "Integration" of the Dissemination of Information Under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
749 (1964).
17. Section 502(a) of the Code provides:
[Offering Statement.] . . . [Filing requirement.] It is unlawful for any person
in connection with a distribution by him or resulting from his offer (or for an
underwriter, broker, or dealer in connection with a distribution by any person) to
offer a security, or for a broker or dealer to offer to buy a security from an
underwriter in connection with a distribution by or through the underwriter, (1)
unless the issuer has filed an offering statement with respect to the distribution,
or (2) while an offering statement with respect to the distribution is the subject
of a stop order under section 1808(d) or (e) or (before its effectiveness) a public
proceeding under either section or a public investigation under section 1806(d)(1).
FED. SEC. CODE § 502(a).
The corresponding provision of the 1933 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been
filed as to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a
refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration state-
ment) any public proceeding or examination under section 77h of this title.
1933 Act, § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976).
Section 504(a) of the proposed Code provides:
[General.] It is unlawful for any person in connection with a distribution by him
or resulting from his offer (or for an underwriter, broker, or dealer in connection
with a distribution by any person)
(1) to sell or confirm a sale of a security, deliver a security after
sale, or accept payment for a security, unless an offering statement is
14991979]
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makes it unlawful for any person (subject to the exemptions and
exclusions described therein) in connection with a distribution by
him, or for an underwriter in connection with a distribution by any
person, to offer a security unless the issuer has filed an offering
statement with the SEC. 8 Section 504 makes it unlawful for persons
in connection with a distribution to sell a security unless an offering
statement 9 is effective with respect to the distribution.',, These sec-
tions apply to corporate primary offerings as well as to secondary
offerings.
A distribution, a term not defined in the 1933 or 1934 Acts, is
defined in section 242 as "an offering other than (1) a limited offer-
ing or (2) an offering by means of one or more trading transac-
tions."'" Limited offerings are substituted in the Code for the pri-
vate offering exemption, and trading transactions are similar to the
in effect with respect to the distribution;
(2) to confirm a sale of a security unless the buyer has received
a prospectus or preliminary prospectus not later than receipt of the
confirmation; or
(3) to deliver a security after sale or accept payment for a secu-
rity unless the buyer has received a prospectus not later than receipt
of the security or acceptance of payment, whichever first occurs.
FED. SEC. CODE § 504(a).
The corresponding provisions in the 1933 Act are as follows:
Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communi-
cation in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use
or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate com-
merce, by any means or instruments or transportation, any such security for the
purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communi-
cation in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus
relating to any security. with respect to which a registration statement has been
filed under this subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of
section 77j of this title; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate com-
merce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless
accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsec-
tion (a) of section 77j of this title.
1933 Act, §§ 5(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a),(b) (1976).
18. The text of section 502(a) is set out in note 17 supra.
19. An offering statement, the requirements of which are set out in § 502(c) of the Code,
is essentially the same as the registration statement now described under § 7 of the 1933 Act.
20. See text accompanying note 21 infra.
21. FED. SEC. CODE § 242.
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rule 1442 exemption. These terms are described below.23
Section 502(c) of the Code provides that the offering statement
must contain a prospectus, together with whatever information, fi-
nancial statements and other documents the SEC specifies by rule.
Section 505 provides that the prospectus shall contain as much of
the contents of the offering statement as the Commission shall spec-
ify. The Code requires the Commission to take into account the
information already contained in the company's registration state-
ment and whether the issuer is a one-year registrant. 4 This require-
ment is modeled after the current amendments which liberalize
form S-16, the short form provision, for certain reporting compa-
nies.25
Relatively little change has been made by the Code in the area
of primary offerings and integration of 1933 and 1934 Act disclosure
requirements. The methods by which issuers raise capital from the
public will not be greatly affected by the Code. The offering state-
ment will be filed with the Commission and will be reviewed by the
staff as is done today. The regulatory process is still recognizable.
The Code, however, uses new words, new phrases and new sen-
tences. These may well be a fertile ground for disagreement as to
meaning, a basis for lawsuits, and of course a launching pad for new
SEC regulations to implement the Code. This is a pattern which,
by the nature of things, occurs throughout the Code. Even where the
Code leaves old concepts in place, the chemical interaction of new
language and agile lawyers may lead to future litigation. The ques-
tion, of course, is whether the technical improvements rendered by
the Code will outweigh the task of interpreting and implementing a
new Code.
More fundamentally, the Code does not break new ground in
the area of quality and modality of disclosure. As is pointed out
22. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978).
23. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text infra.
24. A one-year registrant, a key term in the Code, is a firm which has continually been
a registrant and, therefore, has continuously reported for at least one year. FED. SEC. CODE §
299.16. Reporting for one-year registrants is not really a new concept. It is similar to the
reporting now required by §§ 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1976).
25. Form S-16, 17 C.F.R. § 239.27 (1978), is a form for registration of certain securities
under the 1933 Act. Form S-16 is simpler and shorter than other available forms for registra-
tion of securities under the 1933 Act. Issuers permitted to use form S-16 are required to file
periodic reports under the 1934 Act, containing information about their business management
and financial operations. The form was recently amended to permit its expanded use in
primary offerings to the public and to existing security holders. The amendment became
effective May 30, 1978. Securities Act Rel. No. 5923 (Apr. 11, 1978).
1979]
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later,"6 economists, lawyers and financial analysts are engaged in a
lively debate over the efficacy and relevance of SEC disclosure.
Many believe that SEC disclosure is useless, irrelevant and requires
fundamental restructuring." In this regard, SEC Commissioner
Roberta Karmel has recently pointed out that some responsible
experts believe that a government mandated disclosure system is
unnecessary, at least in an era when the market is pervaded by.
sophisticated institutional investors." Contrary to this, the recent
SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure indicated its be-
lief that market forces cannot supply a sufficient degree of accurate
and timely information." Other observers believe that government-
imposed disclosure is necessary, but argue that the Commission has
failed to make an effective cost-benefit analysis of the current sys-
tem of disclosure 1
Of course, it the current modes of SEC mandated disclosure are
fundamentally flawed, then a Code which ignores these issues will
run the risk of irrelevance no matter how well it is linguistically put
together. The first recodification of the securities acts in forty years,
however, makes no significant effort to address these issues. I hasten
to add that the Code draftsmen deliberately avoided these prob-
lems. They believed that Code legislation could not and should not
impose a manual of disclosure content. 31 My personal opinion is that
they should have grappled with the truly fundamental problems of
disclosure content. I think that the Code would have been a remark-
able vehicle for a fundamental reconstruction of the contents of
disclosure.
A. Limited Offerings
A key element in the redo of current regulations concerned with
26. See text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
27. See Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES (H. Manne
ed. 1969); G. STIGLER & M. COHEN, CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES PROTECT CONSUMERS? (1971),
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Markets: An Evaluation of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); Benston, The Value of the SEC's Account-
ing Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACCOUNTING REV. 515 (1969).
28. See 475 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-12 (Oct. 25, 1978).
29. Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Disclosure Study Report, [1977-78
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 81,300 (Sept. 8, 1977).
30. See Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Laymen, 28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1973); Kripke,
The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1151 (1970);
Schneider, Nits, Grits and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972).
31. See Loss, Keynote Address: The Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1431,
1440 n.38 (1979); FED. SEC. CODE § 502(c).
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corporate offerings to the public is the limited offering exemption.
Section 242(b) of the proposed Code exempts a "limited offering"
from the definition of distribution. Limited offerings are substituted
in the Code for the private offering exemption.2 A limited offering
is one in which the initial purchasers, excluding institutional buy-
ers, do not exceed thirty-five. There is no ceiling on the number of
institutional purchasers.
Professor Loss has described how the Code settled upon the
number thirty-five:
After we reached the point of saying a limited offering is an
offering that results in not more than "X" buyers, we had to
decide what should be the "X". Naturally, I started with twenty-
five because that was more or less the rule at one time. Then, at
one of the meetings of the advisory group, several of the Advisors
said twenty-five might be a bit tight in some instances, because,
after all, today you can rationalize an offering to more than
twenty-five even without institutions. At that point, Commis-
sioner Loomis, one of the Advisers, said: "I think I might take
thirty-five," and I said: "sold"-and that is how we got the
thirty-five.Y
32. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act expressly provides for such an exemption for any transac-
tion "not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976). Rule 146 was enacted in
an effort (much criticized) to bring into sharper focus the standards of the private offering
exemption. The most important requirements which must be met in order to qualify for the
exemption under rule 146 include: (1) each offeree must have financial sophistication or
financial security such to be able to bear the economic risk of the transaction; (2) each offeree
must have access to or be supplied with information necessary to analyze the risks and
benefits of the venture; (3) the private offering is limited to 35 purchasers; (4) the issuer must
take steps to insure each original purchaser does not make a nonexempt, public distribution
of the securities purchased; and (5) no advertising or general solicitation of any kind is
permitted. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1978).
The SEC has recently summarized the rule as follows:
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that offers and sales of securi-
ties by an issuer not involving any public offering are exempt from the registration
provisions of the Act. Rule 146 provides objective standards for determining when
the exemption is available. The main conditions of the rule require that (1) there
be no general advertising or soliciting in connection with the offering; (2) offers
be made only to persons the issuer reasonably believes have the requisite knowl-
edge and experience in financial and business matters or who can bear the
economic risk; (3) sales be made only to persons as described above except that
persons meeting the economic risk test must also have an offeree representative
capable of providing the requisite knowledge and experience; (4) offerees have
access to or be provided information comparable to that elicited through registra-
tion; (5) there be no more than 35 purchasers in the offering; and (6) reasonable
care be taken to ensure that the securities are not resold in violation of the Act's
registration provisions.
Securities Act Rel. No. 5913, 1978 [Transfer Binder] FED. SEc.:L. REP. (CCH) 81,532 (Mar.
6, 1978).
33. Loss, The "Limited Offering" under the American Law Institute's Federal Securities
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Empirical studies might have determined whether the number
thirty-five could be increased without hurting investors. In any
event, economists could have been invited to determine the feasibil-
ity and advisability of empirical research to determine a proper
cutoff. No such effort was made here or in any other area of the
Code.
The method by which the number thirty-five was reached is an
example of a method of procedure which is necessary in everyday
decisionmaking. Immediate decisions must be made without the
effort to make serious empirical investigations. This, however, is not
the method by which fundamental changes in the Code should be
made. This is particularly true since the drafting of the Code took
nine years.
The number of offerees is no criterion whatsoever in determin-
ing whether the offering is a public offering as it is in current judicial
doctrine outside of rule 146.14 Moreover, there are no Code require-
ments that the issuer prepare a special package of information for
the buyers, as is currently required by the judicial gloss of rule 146. :15
The Code also eliminates the requirement that purchasers possess
a certain degree of financial sophistication, affluence or access to
information about the issuer. The justification for this new ap-
proach is that limited offerings affect too small a number of persons
to invoke the burden of federal regulation. Furthermore, the expec-
tation is that the antifraud provisions of the Code will provide the
proper degree of in terrorem pressure to preserve the required degree
of honesty.
In the case of issuers that are not one-year registrants, the SEC
under section 242(b)(3) may reimpose by rule sophistication and
information delivery requirements on the limited offering transac-
tion. If the Commission utilizes that discretion, small issuers or new
ventures will be subject to far more rigorous limited'offering require-
ments than are large issuers. This will occur because it will be new
ventures or the relatively small corporations that are not the one-
year registrants. As a result, there may be an invidious impact on
the capital formation process for startup ventures or small issuers
as compared to the larger issuers." Whether there would be such an
Code, in FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 40-41 (R. Mundheim, A.
Fleischer & J. Schupper eds. 1973).
34. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977);
Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, nc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
35. See, e.g. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
36. See Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical
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impact is an empirical question which the Code in this respect and
others was not designed to solve.
The justification for permitting sophistication and information
delivery requirements for the smaller issuers who are not one-year
registrants is that in the absence of the continuous disclosure that
results from one-year registration, investors need protection. An-
other argument offered by the Reporter is that small business is
more fraudulent than large. 7 The absolute elimination of such re-
quirements in the case of one-year registrants represents a judgment
that such requirements are unnecessary or unduly burdensome be-
cause of the continuous reporting structure imposed upon corpora-
tions which have registered pursuant to section 402 of the Code.
None of these judgments were made as a result of empirical re-
search. They represent attorneys' hunches, rather than scientific
social research.
The elimination of the sophistication and information require-
ments for one-year registrants (and perhaps all issuers) is consistent
with the current thinking of securities lawyers. They have cam-
paigned for years in law review articles and in statements to the
Commission and staff for the elimination of such requirements. To
date their campaign has met with failure. Rule 146 requires sophis-
tication, sometimes some degree of affluence, and delivery of infor-
mation in order to quality a private offering under the rule. Outside
the rule, the courts have elaborated a judicial gloss on section 4(2)
of the 1933 Act which requires financial sophistication and informa-
tion delivery or access to information about the issuer."
The sophistication concept has been said to be elusive, complex
and subjective" and, as such, the elimination of the requirements
for sophistication and delivery of information have been widely ac-
cepted by securities attorneys. The elimination of such require-
ments, however, represents a judgment that is hardly incontrover-
tible. Naive and ignorant investors may need special protection.
Rule 146 and section 4(2) forces the issuer to put together a coherent
package of information about itself and the deal. That package is
at least arguably a great aid to the potential purchaser in a private
offering because he can examine a finished and complete offering
Foreclosure From the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139.
37. Panel Discussion, Fourth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1519, 1524 (1979).
38. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971);
Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
39. Kinderman, The Private Offering Exemption: An Examination of its Availability
Under and Outside Rule 146, 30 Bus. LAW 921, 928 (1975).
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circular about the issuer. These advantages are eliminated by pro-
posed section 242(b).
Thus, because of the elimination of certain requirements, the
limited offering exemption as to one-year registrants will be much
easier to comply with than section 4(2) of the 1933 Act and accom-
panying rule 146. Whether Congress will agree that the benefit to
securities lawyers and their corporate issuer clients outweighs the
disadvantages, if any, to prospective limited offering purchasers is
an important policy decision it will have to make. If the legislators
in their wisdom reimpose the rule 146 and section 4(2) regulatory
gloss on the Code, then a major difference between current law and
Code change will have been eliminated.
It must be emphasized at this point that the changes contem-
plated by the Code in the area of limited offerings (or elsewhere for
that matter) were made without benefit of scientific empirical stud-
ies. We do not know whether the Code changes will have a great, a
minor or no impact on the American capital formation process.
Perhaps the limited offering area should be liberalized well beyond
that proposed by the Code. Perhaps it should not. We have no way
of knowing, of course, whether moving one way or the other in this
private offering area is helpful or harmful to investors and to capital
formation. The SEC could ease the current burdens of private offer-
ings to a considerable extent without need of a vast new Code. It is
unwise, however, to freeze the new Code provisions in this area
based upon lawyers' hunches.
B. Local Distribution
The intrastate offering exemption of section 3(a)(11) of the 1933
Act, as supplemented by rule 147, is preserved in modified form by
section 514.10 Section 514 is far more liberal than the current restric-
tive exemption. The present exemption requires the issuer to be
both incorporated in the state and primarily doing business in the
40. Sec. 514 [Local distribution.] (a) [Definition.] A "local distribution" is
one that (1) results in sales substantially restricted to persons who are residents
of or have their primary employment in a single State, or an area in contiguous
States (or a State and a contiguous foreign country) as that area is defined by
rule or order on consideration of its population and economic characteristics, and
(2) involves securities of an issuer that does business or proposes to do business
primarily in that State or area, regardless of where it is organized. Section 514(a)
(1) is not satisfied unless at least 95 percent of all the buyers holding of record at
least 80 percent of the securities distributed are persons there described.
FED. SEC. CODE § 514.
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state. " Concerning the nature of the issuer, only the latter condition
must be met, and the place of incorporation has no bearing on the
exemption. Another liberalizing change concerns the offerees and
purchasers. Section 3(a)(11) and rule 147 require each offeree to be
a resident of the single state of the issuer. This provision has been
liberalized in .two ways. First, section 514 is not concerned with
offerees, but looks to the final sales of the securities. Second, the
sales are not limited to purchasers residing in the state, but extend
to 'purchasers who have their residence or primary employment in
the defined legislative area. The area in which the securities may
be sold has also been expanded. The 1933 Act limits the exemption
to transactions occurring all within one state. The proposed exemp-
tion will increase this area to include contiguous states, as that area
is defined by rule or order.
As a consequence of these liberalizing changes, an increased
number of distributions will fall under the exemption as compared
with the number currently qualifying under section 3(a)(11) and
rule 147.
The new intrastate exemption obviously will leave more distri-
butions under the principal regulatory control of the states.2 Any
disclosure requirements will arise from the individual state blue sky
law.4 3 Under the Uniform Securities Act, disclosure would normally
be required." This leaves open, however, the question whether state
administrators will require the same, less, or more quality or quan-
tity of disclosure as would have been required by the SEC.
I can make the same comments about the changes in the intra-
state offering exemption as I did with respect to private offerings.
No empirical studies were made of the present operation of the
intrastate exemption. We do not know whether it is working well
or working poorly. Therefore, we have no benchmark against which
to measure the Code changes. Perhaps the Code should have de-
fined the term area and removed it from the rulemaking authority
of the SEC. Perhaps the exemption should have been left un-
touched. Perhaps the exemption should have been eliminated in
its entirety. Code decisions made in this area are empirically arbi-
trary. As frequently occurs elsewhere, they are based upon practi-
cal hunches about what direction the securities law should take.
41. See 1933 Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1976); rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147
(1978).
42. See generally FED. SEC. CODE § 1904, Note 2.
43. See generally, UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT; BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH); J. MOFSKY, BLUE
SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS (1971).
44. See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §§ 301, 402.
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That is not the best basis for a wholesale revamping of the securities
laws.
IV. SECONDARY TRANSACTIONS
The linguistic and conceptual changes from the 1933 Act are
more numerous in the treatment by the Code of secondary transac-
tions than in the area of primary offerings. Whether the empirical
impact of these changes will actually alter the ongoing development
of the law in this area, however, I have no way of knowing.
Among these changes, section 502 requires that, absent an ex-
emption, specific information in the form of an "offering state-
ment" 5 must be filed with the Commission if a "distribution" is to
be made. Because the Code eliminates the concept of a "control
person,"" the only real issues to be resolved in determining if a filing
with the Commission is mandated is whether the planned transac-
tion is a distribution and whether an exemption is available. The
term distribution, which is not specifically defined in the current
law, is defined by the Code as "an offering other than (1) a limited
offering or (2) an offering by means of one or more trading transac-
tions."47 These exceptions, limited offerings and trading transac-
tions, provide escape hatches by which fortunate secondary distrib-
utors may avoid regulatory encumbrance.
Individuals and institutions" which have purchased securities
in a limited offering are free to resell those securities within the
restricted selling period49 provided that the transactions "do not
result in more than thirty-five owners of those securities (apart from
any institutional investors and persons who become owners other-
wise than by purchase)."5 0 This raises the possibility that persons
who resell early will be more likely to come within the thirty-five
owner limit than their colleagues who decide to sell later in the time
span. In any event, a buyer will have to rely on the issuer to deter-
mine when the thirty-five owner limit is reached and when the
45. An "offering statement" is the term substituted for the § 5 "registration statement"
of the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976); FED. SEC. CODE §§ 268, 502.
46. See 1933 Act §§ 2(11), 4(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(11), 77d(1) (1976); 1933 Act rule 405,
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1978).
47. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(a).
48. These terms are utilized without regard to their status as affiliates or control persons.
49. The restricted selling period is three years in the case of an issuer who has not
attained one year registrant status, FED. SEC. CODE §§ 242(b)(1)(B), 299.16, and one year in
the case of a one-year registrant, id. § 242(b)(2)(A). After the one year period runs, the seller
can utilize the trading transaction exclusion described infra.
50. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b)(1)(B).
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restricted selling period ends. This imposes the difficult, but not
insurmountable, burden on issuers to determine the number of di-
rect and indirect beneficial owners. Additionally, the reseller would
appear to be dangerously exposed to liability if he relies on incorrect
information supplied by the issuer. Since, however, Code section
242(b)(7) permits the reseller to act in good faith reliance on the
issuer to avoid civil liablity,5' there appears to be sufficient certainty
and safety for the reseller.
, The second escape hatch is provided by the "trading transac-
tion"52 exclusion from distribution. This provision is similar in gen-
eral outline to the current rule 144. 51 The Code exemption from filing
requirements covers transations
through a broker or with or by a dealer [when] (A) the transac-
tion is not . . . for the account or benefit of the issuer . . .; (B)
the security was not the subject of a limited offering within the
one-year or three-year period . . .; (C) the broker or dealer per-
forms no more than the usual function of a broker or dealer...
and receives no unusual compensation; and (D) the total of all
trading transactions originating with . . . the same person...
does not exceed whatever amount . . . the Commission specifies
by rule.54
Section 242(c)(2) provides that the Commission may add additional
conditions to those set forth above when the issuer is not a one-year
registrant. When compared with rule 144, section 242 is not much
more "liberal," particularly in view of the recent evolution of rule
144.11
51. Compare FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b)(7), with 1933 Act rule 144(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. §
230.144(c)(1) (1978):
The person for whose account the securities are to be sold shall be entitled to rely
upon a statement in whichever is the most recent report, quarterly or annual,
required to be filed and filed by the issuer that such issuer has filed all reports
required to be filed . . . unless he knows or has reason to believe that the issuer
has not complied with such requirements.
52. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(c).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978).
54. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(c)(1).
55. Rule 144, pursuant to an amendment effective March 12, 1979, now permits nonaffi-
Hates in specified circumstances to ignore the volume limitations of the rule after a holding
period of either three or four years. The text of the amendment is as follows:
Sales by persons other than affiliates. The amount of restricted securities sold for
the account of any person other than an affiliate of the issuer, together with all
other sales of restricted securities of the same class for the account of such person
within the preceding three months, shall not exceed the amount specified in
paragraphs (e)(1)(i), (1)(ii), or (1)(iii) of this section, whichever is applicable. The
limitation in this paragraph (e)(2), however, shall not apply to restricted securi-
ties sold for the account of a person who is not an affiliate of the issuer at the
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When the concept of the Code was first contemplated some
eleven years ago, rule 144 was not yet on the books,5" although its
concept was discussed in many areas including the famous Wheat
Report.57 Now that rule 144 has been on the books for some years, I
again ask the question whether we need a statute to do what the rule
does. This is a question which is applicable to many other changes
in the Code and which I have reiterated with regard to other provi-
sions. Here, as elsewhere, the Code evidences a regulatory lag, in
that it is proposing changes which are already in place. The more
fundamental problem is that we have no empirical research which
shows us that the trading exclusion is either a good idea or a bad
idea. Although many securities practitioners think that rule 144 is
working well, not all agree, and those who agree or disagree are
merely relying on hunches and guesswork. Despite this, the Code
would elevate this rule to a statute. This is not, for the reasons I
have indicated above, the best way to engage in fundamental legis-
lative change.
Potential problems arise if we consider a case in which the
secondary distributor wishes to distribute the securities of an issuer
which is not a one-year registrant. As indicated above, it is prima
facie unlawful under the Code for a reseller, in connection with a
distribution by him, to make an offering unless the issuer has filed
an offering statement," regardless of whether the reseller is either
in control of the issuer, or is not an underwriter. Thus, under the
Code, if the issuer refuses to file an offering statement with respect
time of the sale and has not been an affiliate during the preceding three months,
Provided: (1) The securities have been beneficially owned by the person for a
period of at least three years prior to their sale and are part of a class that is either
listed on a national securities exchange or quoted in the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc.'s electronic interdealer quotation system known as NAS-
DAQ, or (ii) the securities have been beneficially owned by the person for a period
of at least four years prior to their sale and the issuer thereof is in compliance
with the requirements of paragraph (c)(1) of this section regarding the filing of
reports under sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In
computing the holding period for purposes of this provision, reference should be
made to paragraph (d)(4) of this section.
Further, in regard to securities that were purchased, the full purchase price
or other consideration shall have been paid or given at least three or four years,
respectively, prior to their sale in order to satisfy the beneficial ownership require-
ments of (e)(2)(i) or (ii) of this section.
44 Fed. Reg. 15612 (1979) (amending 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1978)).
56. Rule 144 became effective on April 15, 1972. See 37 Fed. Reg. 596 (1972).
57. SEC-DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (CCH ed. 1969).
58. This would be true assuming there is no exemption. See, e.g., FED. SEC. CODE §
514(c).
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to the particular securities which the secondary distributor desires
to sell, the secondary distributor might be unable to sell the securi-
ties and thereby become locked into his stock position. The solution
to this problem is Code section 502(b). In Draconian fashion, this
provision forces an issuer which has not achieved one-year registrant
status to file an offering statement on the demand of a holder of
securities who proposes to make a distribution. In other words, a
closely held "ma and pa" corporation can be forced to disclose all
to the SEC in an offering statement on the demand of a single
security holder in order to prevent a lock-in of the secondary distrib-
utor which was caused by conceptual changes of the Code. This
requirement is conditioned upon the agreement of the secondary
distributor to deposit "the reasonably estimated expenses"" of the
filing in advance and to pay necessary additional expenses promptly
on demand of the issuer. 0 The issuer may avoid the filing require-
ment if it arranges to purchase the securities which are the subject
of the demand." Furthermore, the demand provision does not apply
with respect to securities held by a person who has signed a written
waiver of his rights 2 or who is "contractually or legally bound by a
restriction on transfer that would be violated by the proposed distri-
bution."63
The filing on demand requirement obviously represents a sig-
nificant change from the philosophy surrounding the 1933 Act. As
Professor Loss has pointed out, this provision is the necessary result
of the Code filing requirement for all secondary offerings;" and the
limit to non-one-year registrants is the result of the liberal provi-
sions available to secondary distributions involving the securities of
one-year registrants under which offering statements are not re-
quired as a condition to sales. 5
Although this Code provision represents a skillful lawyer's han-
dling of the problem, its empirical results are far from clear. For
example, a majority of issuers may try to obtain the written waiver.
If they succeed, the filing on demand provision will be rendered a
dead letter. This is a matter of some concern because, on the way
to becoming a dead letter, the pressure this provision puts on issuers
to obtain the waiver could impact on the price of the offering as a
59. See id. § 502(b).
60. Id. § 502(c).
61. Id. §§ 502(b)(6)(C), 502(b)(7).
62. Id. § 502(b)(6)(A)(i).
63. Id. § 502(b)(6)(A)(ii).
64. See Loss, supra note 31, at 1440-43.
65. Id.
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result of the inevitable bargaining process which I believe would
ensue. We must also concern ourselves with the possible adverse
impact, in terms of demands on the time and effort of key company
officers that the preparation of an offering statement requires, upon
issuers who do not obtain the waiver.
Imagine a typical negotiation involving a non-one-year regis-
trant. The issuer's officers and counsel will most likely want the
purchaser of securities to sign a written waiver. Without this waiver,
purchasers would enjoy the privilege of filing on demand. Prospec-
tive purchsers, however, will be very reluctant to waive their rights
because of their awareness of the limitations this would impose
upon their freedom to resell the securities in the future. Suppose
that a corporation offers its stock to a limited group of persons at
fifteen dollars per share and, in addition the corporation demands
a written waiver of their rights. It is conceivable that the purchasers
might agree to sign the waiver only if the offering price is dis-
counted. In other words, "we will give you a written waiver if you
sell to us at seven dollars per share rather than fifteen." In advance
of the enactment of the Code, we do not know if negotiations of this
kind will actually occur or, if they do, what impact they will have
on the capital formation process of the comparatively small issuers
which will be subject to this provision. Here, as in many other
provisions of the Code, there have been no scientific attempts to
analyze the empirical consequences of a new provision.
The filing on demand provision is an example of an area in
which the Code has potentially increased the regulatory burden
placed upon a certain class of issuers. Conversely, other provisions
amount to a loosening of the regulatory harness."' No empirical
evidence has been presented to suggest that we should tighten regu-
lation in one area and loosen it in another; yet, we are prepared to
enter unknown territory with provisions based solely upon predeter-
mined fears of future occurrences without any knowledge of' what
the impact of those provisions will be. The fear that has led to the
regulatory tightening in the case of filing on demand is based upon
the fear that, given the construction of the Code, secondary distrib-
utors may be "locked-in." This fear, in turn, is based upon a hunch
which results from the conceptual, as opposed to the empirical,
approach to secondary distributions adopted by the Code.
Another crucial section which must be considered is section
66. See, e.g., FED. SEC. CODE §§ 242(b), which replace § 4(2) of' the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (1976).
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510, which covers secondary distributions by holders of securities
issued by one-year registrants. 7 Secondary distributors " of such
securities may elect to comply with the requirements of this section
for securities of a class in excess of those acquired through a limited
offering which are still within the one-year restrictive period pro-
vided in section 242(b)(2) on limited offerings. 5 When such an elec-
tion has been made, the necessity for an issuer's offering statement
is eliminated. No issuer filing or consent is mandated. Instead, the
secondary distributor need file only a limited statement termed a
distribution statement. That document merely contains whatever
information, underwriting contracts and other documents concern-
ing the secondary distributor that the Commission establishes by
rule. The secondary distributor must also certify that he is unaware
of any adverse material or significant facts about the issuer that
have not been made public. More or less information may be per-
mitted or required in specific cases as mentioned in the section.
The philosophy in this section is consistent with the overall
approach of the Code. Since one-year registrants are required con-
tinually to make disclosures under the Code, there is assumed to be
no need to generate a new financial document about the issuer in
the case of a secondary distribution no matter how large. This ap-
proach is consistent with recent SEC moves to shorten prospectuses
for sales of securities issued by companies reporting under sections
13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Act. In any event, there is always the in
terrorem effect of the antifraud and civil liability provisions of the
Code. The basic assumption may be questioned by representatives
of investor and "Nader" groups when the legislation is considered
in Congress. They may assert that there is a value to investors in
requiring issuers to prepare special disclosure documents in the case
of large secondary sales.
The secondary distributor in the case of a one-year registrant
has another escape route. Section 512(d) provides that a secondary
distribution, no matter how large in dollar amount or how many
commissions are paid to brokers, is exempt from even the liberal
provisions of the distribution statement when the distributor owns
not more than fifteen percent of the voting securities of the one-year
67. See note 48 supra.
68. " 'Secondary distributor' means a person (other than the issuer) by or for whose
account or benefit a distribution is made." FED. SEC. CODE § 299.51.
69. Section 510(a) creates an election for a secondary distributor of securities issued by
a one-year registrant. The election does not apply to securities acquired during the one-year
restrictive period provided for limited offerings under § 242(b)(2).
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registrant. The exemption applies only to securities in excess of
securities acquired in a limited offering during the one-year restric-
tive period.70 In a sense, this amounts to a reintroduction of the old
control concept into the Code. Under present law a secondary distri-
bution by a person not in control, and who is not an underwriter, is
exempt from any disclosure-filing requirements. A person in control
cannot distribute publicly through brokers unless the issuer regis-
ters with the Commission.
The Code, in effect, applies a conclusive presumption of control
to holdings in excess of fifteen percent and requires a distribution
statement in that case. The section 512(d) exemption was designed
to facilitate so-called block trading, which apparently would be
hindered by the Code mechanics of distribution statements. Ob-
viously, it goes beyond that purpose by permitting certain second-
ary distributors to sell their stock without any filing with the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission. A person who owns less than fifteen
percent of the voting securities of General Motors could sell twenty-
five million dollars worth of stock without any public filing with the
SEC. On the other hand, a primary sale by a relatively small issuer
of a million dollars of stock would require the filing of an offering
circular and the preparation of a prospectus. Of course, there is a
distinction between secondary distributions and primary offerings.
Primary offerings involve the raising of capital. This, in turn, in-
volves a change in the capital structure of the issuer and disclosure
complexities with respect to use of proceeds. Some primary offer-
ings, however, involve very simple changes in capital structure and
equally simple use of proceeds. Large secondary distributions of
twenty-five or fifty million dollars may involve thousands of buyers
and extraordinary brokerage selling efforts. There may be a signifi-
cant prophylactic value to investors in requiring some type of organ-
ized, specially prepared, disclosure package for the multitude of
offerees and purchasers. Although they can use the continuous dis-
closure dcuments which are on file with the SEC, we know that they
almost always will not.
There is yet another exemption for secondary offerings applica-
ble in this case to all issuers whether one-year registrants or not.
Section 512(e) provides an exemption for a transaction incident to
an offering of not more than $100,000. 71 This exemption does not
70. See FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b).
71. Section 512(e) provides:
[Small Offerings.] a transaction incident to an offering of not more than
$100,000 except that (1) the Commission, by rule with respect to any class of
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apply to a transaction in a security that was the subject of a limited
offering within the one or three year restricted period as the case
may be. The Commission by rule may reduce the amount to not less
than $50,000 in any twelve month period. In addition, the Commis-
sion may impose conditions or withdraw the exemption when the
offering exceeds $50,000.
Although attorneys may analyze the language of changes from
present law in the Code in the area of secondary distributions, it is
unclear what the bottom line economic impact of these changes will
be. For example, it is not apparent whether elimination of the old
control concept coupled with the reintroduction of a de facto control
test, i.e., the fifteen percent provision, will have a small, a consider-
able, a great or even a zero impact on the functioning of the capital
markets.
V. THE CODE IN PERSPECTIVE
Although the foregoing represents an overview of the Code pro-
posals for the regulation of securities distributions, there are many
other provisions applicable to the codification of the Securities Act
of 1933.72
The Code project was initiated some ten years ago. Since then,
the SEC and Congress have engaged in a vast regulatory effort to
modify the Securities Acts and to rectify the problems that led to
the initiation of the project. Commissioner Pollack said recently,
"[tihe Code has been under development for over 10 years and
things have dramatically changed. It almost has a regulatory lag in
it.,, 73
The 140 series of rules, the Securities Acts Admendments of
1975, the SIPC legislation, the efforts to improve continuous disclo-
sure by reporting companies, the development of short-form pros-
issuers, securities, or offerings, may (A) reduce the amount to not less than
$50,000 in any twelve-month period or (B) impose conditions or withdraw this
exemption when the offering exceeds $50,000, and (2) this exemption does not
apply to a transaction in a security that was the subject of a limited offering
within the one-year or three-year [for non-one year registrants] period, as the
case may be, specified in section 242(b).
FED. SEC. CODE § 512(e). This exemption covers both primary and secondary offerings. See
also the power given to the SEC to exempt transactions by § 303. FED. SEC. CODE § 303.
72. For example, the Code in § 512(f), (g), & (h) contains with some changes the exemp-
tions now in § 3(a)(9), & (10) of the 1933 Act. Also, the definitions of exempted securities in
§ 302 of the proposed Code parallel those of § 3(a) of the 1933 Act. See Cheek, Exemptions,
ALI Proposed Federal Securities Code, 34 Bus. LAW. 345, 359 (1978).
73. 484 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) AA-2 (Jan. 3, 1979).
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pectuses for reporting companies and the recent efforts to eliminate
onerous filing requirements for smaller issuers have involved count-
less hours of congressional and SEC time and significant efforts by
the practicing bar. There has been substantial criticism of some of
the efforts, particularly in connection with rule 146.11 A case can be
made, however, for the relative success of many of these innova-
tions. Furthermore, the Commission could, under its current rule-
making authority, make even greater strides toward simplicity and
effective disclosure without new legislation.
A question (albeit raised with some reluctance) is whether this
is the proper time to evaluate and legislate a totally new securities
code. The securities industry is in an exceptionally dynamic stage.
The Supreme Court is making significant changes in securities
law.75 The Commission and the industry are grappling with revolu-
tionary changes in capital market structure and problems in disclo-
sure philosophy. The Commission and the securities bar are at-
tempting to understand and implement the massive changes pro-
duced by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. Even under the
best of circumstances, it would be a difficult task for Congress and
the Commission to analyze thoroughly, review, and understand a
new and complex 800 page Code. The question is whether important
ongoing, current problems will be ignored while Congress and the
SEC wrestle with a vast new statutory project.
Furthermore, if enacted, the Code will necessarily involve a
vast new regulatory and intrepretative effort by the SEC and the
bar. They may need to devote five, six or seven years to drafting new
rules and solving new problems.
The securities bar and the Commission have gained an enor-
mous amount of experience and facility with the present securities
acts and their judicial interpretations. It is not self-evident that the
technical improvements made by the Code will outweigh the burden
of interpreting and implementing a new Code and thus on balance
simplify (i.e., lessen the cost of) the legal burden of individual and
corporate clients of the securities bar.
74. See, e.g., Cheek, Exemptions under the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND.
L. REV. 355 (1977); 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 343 (1977); 59 VA. L. REv. 886 (1973).
75. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979) (company held estopped
from relitigating liability determined in SEC injunctive action in a subsequent class action
for damages); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (narrowing meaning of fraud in
a private cause of action under rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act to exclude nondeceptive and
nonmanipulative breaches of fiduciary duty); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (requiring scienter in a private cause of action under rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (refusing private causes of action for money
damages to nonpurchasers or sellers).
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The consensus of the impressive roster of securities lawyers who
have worked directly on the Code enthusiastically favors the enact-
ment of the Code. The Code, of course, is a lawyer's effort to sim-
plify the legal complexities that have arisen in the field. No system-
atic or scientific effort has been made by the sponsors of the Code
to evaluate the empirical effects of the changes proposed by the
Code. Furthermore, the Code does not, nor was it intended to, deal
with the deep divisions among economists, lawyers and financial
analysts about the fundamental worth or manner of presentation of
current modes of corporate disclosure.76
Although the Code was never intended to address the complex
philosophical, empirical or disclosure issues referred to, this is not
necessarily a justification for its not doing so. The technical artistry
with which Professor Loss and his colleagues have drafted this mon-
umental new Code is extraordinarily impressive. This is, however,
a lawyer's code. It lacks input from other disciplines. For example,
economists have not had a significant opportunity in an organized
manner to evaluate this Code and to make recommendations.
The securities legislation was a 1930's answer to the perceived
problems that occurred in the 1920's and early 1930's. It was a great
experiment which resulted in a proud and famous agency, the SEC.
It was a successful experiment because it helped to restore the con-
fidence of Americans in the capital markets of the United States.
Forty years have passed since that noble experiment. New doubts
about the wisdom and direction of the 1930's statutes have arisen.
We are no longer as willing as we were in prior years to accept
without doubt and qualification the value of regulation in and of
itself. As Commissioner Karmel has pointed out in recent speeches,
there is a danger that automatic adherence to regulation will stifle
the vigor and dynamism of our free enterprise system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The draftsmen of the Code have largely proceeded based upon
76. See Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus.
LAW. 43 (1968); Comment, Utilization of Investment Analysis Principles in the Development
of Disclosure Policy Under the Federal Securities Laws, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 292 (1977)
(advocating that securities disclosure laws conform to economic realities in order for them to
function effectively in individual and social welfare). See also J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND POLICY (4th ed. 1977); Benston, supra note 27; Kassout, Towards a Legal
Framework for Efficiency and Equity in the Securities Markets, 25 HAST. L.J. 417 (1974);
Kripke, A Search for a Meaning of the Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293 (1975);
Pozen, Money Managers and Securities Research, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 923 (1976); Wolfson,
supra note 6, at 287.
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the assumptions of the 1930's. Although they have made many sig-
nificant and brilliantly conceived changes, they have not asked
really fundamental questions about the direction that securities leg-
islation should take over the next fifty or sixty years. They have
tightened regulation here and loosened it there, without the benefit
of scientific empirical investigation of impact. If Congress is to be
put to the great burden of recodifying the entire body of securities
legislation, then acceptance of regulatory philosophies of the 1930's
is a questionable approach. We should reexamine the securities acts
in light of our current skepticism about the inherent value of eco-
nomic regulation.
I think it is essential that Congress move with deliberate speed
when it reviews the Code. Congressman Eckhardt announced some
months ago that, in view of the impressive skill and care with which
the Code had been prepared, he was not going to establish a sepa-
rate congressional staff study to examine it de novo. He is going to
take the Code as given and move directly into hearings on provisions
of the Code. That decision is a mistake. A de novo congressional
review of the Code and of the basic policy problems that have arisen
in the securities field is necessary.
In raising these reservations and questions, in all fairness Pro-
fessor Loss' rebuttal must be emphasized. As he has pointed out,
there is a danger that in striving for the "best," we will fail to
accomplish the good. That danger must be recognized. Professor
Benston has elsewhere pointed out, however, that the apparently
practical may be the enemy of the good." Furthermore, the pro-
posed new federal legislation will freeze securities concepts into law
for the next thirty, forty or fifty years or more. It would be a mistake
to enact quickly this Code, as brilliantly drafted as it is, without a
probing congressional review which would encompass all the re-
sources and skills of economists and social scientists that lawyers,
at our peril, do without.
77. Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts -and Under the
Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1471 (1979).
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